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 Abstract 
There is an ongoing debate among psychologists regarding the psychological factors 
underlying moral judgments.  Rationalists argue that informational assumptions (i.e. 
ideological beliefs about how the world works) play a causal role in shaping moral 
judgments whereas intuitionists argue that informational assumptions are post hoc 
justifications for judgments made automatically by innate intuitions.  In order to compare 
these two perspectives, the author conducted two studies in which informational 
assumptions related to ingroups and outgroups varied across conditions.  In Study 1, 
political conservatives and liberals completed the moral relevance questionnaire while 
imagining they were in the US, Iran, or no specific country.  Keeping in line with the 
predictions of the intuitionist perspective, the results showed that the judgments of 
conservatives and liberals did not significantly differ across conditions.  Study 2 used a 
more in depth manipulation in which participants read a vignette about a government 
(US, Iran, or the fictional country of Kasbara) violating the rights of a minority group.  
As in Study 1, the results support the intuitionist perspective—the judgments of 
conservatives and liberals did not significantly differ across conditions.  These findings 
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INTUITIONS OR INFORMATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS? AN INVESTIGATION OF 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS BEHIND MORAL JUDGMENTS 
People are capable of creating a broad range of moral systems.  Same sex 
marriage, women’s rights, and pacifism can be virtues or vices depending on one’s moral 
code.  How can we account for the diversity of moral systems in societies throughout 
history?  Are morals simply social constructs that people internalize early in childhood or 
are people born with biological predispositions to moralize particular actions and 
relationships?  Understanding how people develop their moral worldview and how they 
arrive at specific moral judgments has implications for how we resolve moral debates.  
Among researchers in moral psychology, however, there remains an ongoing 
disagreement regarding answers to these questions. 
According to moral foundations theory (Haidt, 2001), humans have innate moral 
intuitions related to five domains: harm, fairness, loyalty, authority and purity.  The 
domains of harm and fairness govern the welfare of individuals whereas the other three 
domains govern the welfare of the group as a whole.  Innateness does not mean that 
morality is biologically determined. Rather, these intuitions create the boundary 
conditions for the types of morality that human societies can create (Haidt & Graham, 
2008; Haidt & Joseph, 2004).  Through the process of enculturation, people’s intuitions 
are tuned to their culture’s moral system.  Specific patterns of behavior will automatically 
trigger a corresponding moral judgment, regardless of the situation or context (Graham, 
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2001).  According to this perspective, moral reasoning 
based on beliefs, ideas, and values is a conscious, effortful cognitive process and 
therefore can play no role (except in rare cases) in the formation of moral judgments.  As 
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a result, moral foundations theory argues that researchers exploring moral judgments can 
and should ignore people’s consciously held beliefs about the world.  
 Although moral foundations theory has received a great deal of attention both 
within academic circles and popular media, it is not without its detractors (see, for 
example Pizarro & Bloom, 2003; Turiel, 2006; Prinz, 2008).  The specific critiques of 
moral foundations theory are wide-ranging and come from a variety of disciplines 
including psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience (Pizarro & Bloom, 2003; Prinz, 
2008; Suhler & Churchland, 2011; Turiel, 2006).  For current purposes, I will refer to 
critics of moral foundations theory as proponents of the rationalist perspective.  This 
perspective argues that informational assumptions—deeply held beliefs about how the 
world works—play a causal role in shaping automatic moral judgments (Nucci & Turiel, 
1978; Turiel, 1998).  Although they do not disagree with Haidt’s (2001) assertion that 
moral judgments are often automatic, they argue that informational assumptions are an 
integral part of shaping these automatic processes (Pizarro & Bloom, 2003; Turiel, 2006).  
In other words, differences in moral judgments (e.g. differences with regard to whether 
abortion is morally wrong) may reflect differences in informational assumptions (e.g. life 
begins at conception) and not intuitions (Hatch, 1983).   
 In the current research, I compare the intuitionist perspective of moral foundations 
and the rationalist perspective by examining the moral judgments of conservatives and 
liberals.  I conducted two experiments that examined participants’ self-reported use of the 
five moral domains in ingroup versus outgroup social contexts.  In so doing, I was able to 
assess whether the informational assumptions associated with ingroups and outgroups 
impact people’s moral judgments.  If they do, it will suggest that beliefs and values play a 
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causal role in shaping moral judgments.  If they do not, it will suggest that intuitions may 
in fact be the driving force behind moral judgments.  In the following sections, I (1) 
review the logic and empirical justifications for both the intuitionist and the rationalist 
perspectives; (2) discuss the theoretical differences and competing predictions of the two 
perspectives; and (3) conduct two studies that pit the two approaches against one another, 
with the goal of determining whether informational assumptions are relevant in shaping 
moral judgments. 
THE INTUITIONIST PERSPECTIVE 
Moral foundations theory argues that moral judgments are the product of moral 
intuitions: automatic and rapid cognitive processes that produce affective flashes 
indicating approval or disapproval (Graham et al., 2009; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 
2001; Haidt & Graham, 2007).  Haidt and Joseph (2004) describe moral intuitions as 
“little bits of input-output programming” (p. 60) triggered by particular patterns of 
behavior in the environment (for discussion, see Pizarro & Bloom, 2003; Suhler & 
Churchland, 2011; Haidt & Joseph, 2011).  According to this theory, reasoning is a post 
hoc process that functions simply to manipulate others into agreeing with one’s intuition 
(Haidt, 2001).   
At the neurological level, Haidt’s intuitions are more appropriately called 
modules.  Although there is no universally agreed upon definition of modularity, 
generally speaking, a particular mental process might be classified as modular if it occurs 
automatically and without input from other processes in the brain.  The modular theory of 
the mind is itself a highly contested topic in neuroscience.  This is in part because 
researchers lack the imaging technology to assess the existence of modules directly.  
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Although imaging studies can (and do) show higher levels of activation in localized areas 
of the brain when people make moral judgments (for a review, see Greene & Haidt, 
2002), this is not sufficient evidence for intuitions, as other theories can easily account 
for localized activation (Suhler & Churchland, 2011).  As a result, researchers can only 
offer indirect evidence that might suggest modularity. 
Keeping with this line of thought, Haidt cites evidence from moral dumbfounding 
studies as evidence for the modularity of moral judgments (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993).  
In these studies, participants are given a story in which people commit taboo acts that 
most people regard as immoral.  Importantly, however, these stories are carefully 
constructed so that there is no violation of the harm and fairness domains.  For example, 
in one story, a man wants to clean his house but he does not have any cleaning rags.  He 
finds an American flag, cuts it up and uses the pieces as cleaning rags.  In another story, a 
brother and sister decide to have sex with one another because they are curious about 
what the experience would be like.  He uses a condom and she in on birth control, so 
there is no chance of pregnancy.  They enjoy the experience, feel that it has brought them 
closer together, but they make the decision not to do it again.  After hearing the stories, 
participants were asked whether or not the people in these scenarios acted immorally and 
then justify their answers.    
If anyone tried to justify a judgment by appealing to violations of harm or 
fairness, the experimenters would correct them.  For example, if a participant brought up 
the possibility of pregnancy from siblings’ sexual encounter, the experimenter would 
remind them that the brother used a condom and the his sister was on birth control.  Or, if 
participants suggested that sex could have hurt their relationships, the experimenter 
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would remind them that they both felt the experience brought them closer together.  Haidt 
found that most people remained steadfast in their initial judgment despite the fact that 
they could not justify their position.  After having all of their reasons refuted by the 
experimenter, people would often say something like, “I don’t why, but it’s just wrong.”  
For Haidt, this was evidence of the moral modules at work.  According to this 
interpretation, the moral taboos in these stories activated people’s binding modules which 
in turn produced a judgment (i.e. an intuition) that the actions in the story were immoral.  
Once the automatic judgment had been made, people’s higher level reasoning abilities 
kicked in to justify the intuition.  And even after their justifications proved to be 
erroneous, the intuition remained and they stuck by their initial judgment.   
In this sense, rather than behaving like a scientist searching for the truth, reason is 
like a lawyer, marshaling evidence and interpreting it in whatever way makes the best 
case for the client (i.e. the intuitive judgment) (Haidt, 2001).  Although Haidt (2001) 
acknowledges that worldviews are strongly correlated with moral judgments (Nucci & 
Turiel, 1978; Turiel & Wainryb, 1998), he warns against inferring causation from the 
correlation.  For example, regarding the issue of abortion, Haidt (2001) argues: 
The correlation…between the judgment [that abortion is wrong] and supporting 
belief does not necessarily mean that the belief caused the judgment.  An 
intuitionist interpretation is just as plausible: The anti-abortion judgment (a gut 
feeling that abortion is bad) causes the belief that life begins at conception (an ex 
post facto rationalization of the gut feeling). (p.817) 
Thus, because beliefs and reasons (i.e. informational assumptions) are brought to 
bear after the intuitive judgment, they cannot, by definition, play a causal role in 
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judgment formation.  Accordingly, Haidt and colleagues (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 
2009) posit that ideological beliefs and their justifications “might be epiphenomena that 
can safely be ignored in the study of moral and political behavior,” (p. 111). 
According to the intuitionist, children come into the world with a biological 
preparedness to form moral intuitions in five domains: harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, 
and purity. Haidt refers to harm and fairness as individualizing domains in that they 
regulate interactions between individual group members (Graham & Haidt, 2011).  The 
harm intuition evolved to recognize and respond to the pain and suffering of individuals, 
whereas the fairness intuition evolved to address issues of reciprocity and justice for 
individual group members.  In contrast, loyalty, authority, and purity are binding domains 
because they address group-level concerns and help suppress selfish desires (Haidt & 
Graham, 2008).  The loyalty intuition moralizes group-solidarity, patriotism, and self-
sacrifice for the good of the group; the authority intuition moralizes behaviors such as 
obedience (for subordinates) and good leadership (for those in power); and the purity 
intuition moralizes the suppression of more “primal” urges such as lust and greed.  
These innate capacities, however, are only propensities for moral development in 
these domains.  Cultures can emphasize certain domains and deemphasize others, much 
in the same way that cultural cuisines can emphasize certain tastes and deemphasize 
others (Haidt et al., 2009).  Haidt argues that, in the same way that all people have five 
taste receptors, all people have a universal set of moral intuitions; and just like cultural 
cuisines, “moral cuisines” can differ from culture to culture.  Returning to the moral 
dumbfounding studies discussed above, Haidt found this pattern in every population he 
studied, except one.  Liberal participants in the US tended to either not see the taboo acts 
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as immoral, or they would change their judgment after realizing that the principles of 
harm and fairness had not been violated.  This led Haidt to hypothesize that left-wing 
ideology in the West, with its narrow focus on individual rights, was a unique historical 
phenomenon in which people only used two of the five moral domains.  Using his initial 
findings in the moral dumbfounding studies, Haidt went on to further explore the 
differing moral matrices of liberals and conservatives in the US.  
According to Haidt and Graham (2008), moral foundations theory explains the 
ongoing culture wars between conservatives and liberals in the United States.  Moral 
foundations theory argues that conservatives and liberals often take different positions on 
moral issues because liberals have an in individualistic morality based primarily on the 
domains of harm and fairness whereas conservatives have a group-level morality that 
uses all five domains equally (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2001).  Take, for example, a 
government infringing on the rights of marginalized groups in order to protect the status 
quo (Haidt & Graham, 2007).  For liberals, the government’s violation of individual 
freedom triggers their harm and fairness intuitions and they therefore condemn the 
government action.  For conservatives, however, in addition to the governments’ actions 
triggering harm and fairness intuitions, the marginalized groups’ threat to the status quo 
triggers the binding intuitions of loyalty and authority.  As a result, conservatives will 
generally show higher levels of support for the status quo, relative to liberals (Jost, 
Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003).  
In support of this approach, Graham and colleagues (Graham et al., 2009) 
conducted a series of four studies examining the patterns of moral judgments for 
conservatives and liberals in the United States.  These researchers measured individuals’ 
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self-reported use of the five moral foundations using a variety of different methods and 
measures including: rating the general relevance of the foundations in making moral 
judgments (Study 1); making judgments about various scenarios related to the violation 
of a specific intuition (Study 2); reactions to taboo-trade-offs (Study 3); and a textual 
analysis of sermons from the religious-left and –right looking for foundation-related 
words (Study 4).   Across all four studies liberals relied primarily on the individualistic 
domains of harm and fairness whereas conservatives used all five domains equally.   
Graham et al. (2009) interpret the stable pattern of differences as evidence that context-
specific informational assumptions do not significantly impact moral judgments. 
 Thus, conservatives’ support for institutions, traditions, and hierarchies that 
perpetuate inequality and injustice simply “reflects a widespread human tendency to 
believe that the existing social order is morally good, regardless of how it treats us,” (p. 
395-396; Haidt & Graham, 2008).   In short, the harm and fairness intuitions make-up 
almost the entirety of liberal morality; whereas, for conservatives, harm and fairness 
comprise less than half of their moral-matrix (Haidt & Graham, 2007).    
 To summarize, moral foundations theory posits that in order to meet the adaptive 
challenges of the evolutionary environment, humans evolved five moral intuitions: harm, 
fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity.  Each of these intuitions has two components: (1) 
innate and automatic cognitive processes that trigger (2) the corresponding emotional 
response.  From this perspective, moral judgments (good or bad) are the product of 
automatic processes, whereas moral justification (the reason why something is good or 
bad) are post hoc conscious processes that play almost no causal role in moral reasoning.  
From this perspective, conservatives’ opposition to change and acceptance of inequality 
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are simply the natural expression of a five-foundation morality that regards the protection 
of the existing social order and institutions of power as moral issues distinct from harm 
and fairness (Graham & Haidt, 2011; Haidt & Graham, 2008). As a result, social patterns 
that trigger both individual and binding intuitions in conservatives may often lead to 
judgments that differ from the judgments of liberals.  
THE RATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE 
As mentioned above, the critiques of moral foundations theory are wide-ranging 
and come from a variety of disciplines in science and philosophy (Pizarro & Bloom, 
2003; Prinz, 2008; Suhler & Churchland, 2011; Turiel, 2006). However, for current 
purposes, I will focus on two related critiques that challenge central claims of moral 
foundations theory: (1) that the automaticity of moral judgments implies the absence of 
reasoning; and (2) that worldviews have no causal impact on moral judgments. 
First, critics of moral foundations theory argue that the speed and affective-
content of judgments does not mean that reasoning is uninvolved.  Rather, it is evidence 
of a bi-directional relationship in which emotion informs the development and 
maintenance of beliefs and vice versa (Turiel, 1998).  According to Pizarro and Bloom 
(2003), “Prior reasoning can determine the sorts of output” generated by what may 
appear to be “intuitive systems,” (p. 194).  They use the example of a husband or wife 
finding a telephone number in their spouse’s pocket.  This could arouse either jealousy or 
curiosity depending on the individual’s construal of the situation.  Stated another way, 
informational assumptions about oneself (e.g. I am not worth staying with) and one’s 
partner (e.g. my partner is untrustworthy) shape an individual’s automatic appraisal of the 
event.  In short, the automaticity of moral judgments, rather than being evidence for 
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biologically-prepared intuitions, may simply reflect deeply internalized patterns of 
reasoning and judgment (Turiel, 2006). 
Consistent with this idea, an extensive and growing body of research indicates 
that culture-specific beliefs and values play an important role in shaping automatic 
thoughts and behaviors (for a review, see Bargh & Ferguson, 2000).  In particular, 
Devine’s (1989) famous series of studies on stereotyping provides strong evidence for the 
impact of implicit social knowledge on social judgments.  Because of the culturally 
prevalent stereotype that black people are aggressive, Devine hypothesized that 
unconsciously priming words stereotypically associated with Blacks (e.g. welfare, jazz, 
lazy) would cause Whites to evaluate an ambiguously hostile action as significantly more 
hostile; importantly, none of the word-primes were associated with hostility.   
To test this, Devine asked White participants to read a paragraph in which a man 
named Donald engaged in a number of ambiguously hostile behaviors such as refusing to 
pay rent until the landlord repaints his apartment and demanding a refund immediately 
after making a purchase.  After reading the paragraph, participants judged Donald on a 
list of positive and negative traits (e.g. hostile, unfriendly, thoughtful, and kind).  Devine 
found that, when primed with stereotypically black-traits, participants rated Donald more 
negatively, relative to participants in the control condition.  This study demonstrates that 
implicit stereotypes (i.e. informational assumptions) about the aggressiveness of Blacks 
versus Whites impact social judgments such as inferring character traits and intentionality 
to social actors.  
Although Devine was not explicitly assessing participants’ moral judgments, 
somewhat surprisingly, Haidt (2001) uses Devine’s studies as evidence for moral 
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foundations theory. Because “stereotypes often include negative morally evaluated 
traits,” (p.820; Haidt, 2001) Haidt takes the evidence for instantaneous and automatic 
stereotype activation as de facto evidence of moral intuitions.  This interpretation is 
problematic for a couple of reasons.  First, the fact that cognitive processes implicated in 
moral and non-moral social judgments (such as stereotype activation) are both carried out 
automatically is evidence against positing innate processes uniquely designed for moral 
judgments.  Second, and more importantly, Haidt explicitly argues that the moral 
intuitions are triggered by social patterns in the environment.  However, Devine held the 
social patterns constant in her studies—Donald behaved exactly the same way in each 
condition.  Rather, it was Donald’s race that varied across conditions.  This means that 
the differing judgments of Donald’s actions must have been a result of the differing 
informational assumptions associated with race (i.e. the stereotype of blacks as 
aggressive), not intuitions. Thus, contrary to Haidt and colleagues’ argument, 
participants’ assessment of Donald as significantly more hostile and aggressive in the 
Black-race (relative to White-race) condition is evidence of informational assumptions 
effecting moral judgments. 
This line of reasoning relates to the second critique of moral foundations theory: 
the assumption that worldviews have no causal impact on moral judgments.  Although 
they may disagree on issues modularity of moral domains, intuitionists and rationalists 
agree that the domains of harm and fairness are universal features of human society 
(Graham & Haidt, 2011; Haidt & Graham, 2008; Turiel, 1998; Turiel & Wainryb, 1998; 
Wainryb, 1991, 2006).  Indeed, primate research suggests that other primates possess an 
understanding of fairness (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; de Waal, 1996; Dugatkin, 1997).  
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Research by Brosnan and de Waal (2003), for example, found that capuchin monkeys 
will refuse to complete a task if they see another monkey get a more desirable reward for 
completing the same task.  The fact that other primates respond negatively to unequal 
compensation suggests that a sense of fairness has deep roots in our evolutionary 
predating the development of culture.  The central disagreement, at least regarding the 
appropriate taxonomy of morality, is about the existence of the binding domains.  
Rationalists argue that the influence of cultural ideology on the development and 
application of harm and fairness principles is capable of accounting for group-level moral 
concerns. 
Critics argue that the classification of acts related to loyalty, authority, and purity 
as inherently moral “entails an overly literal interpretation of how to classify issues in 
domains (moral or otherwise) that fails to account for the intentions…the surrounding 
context of the actions, and informational assumptions,” (p. 497).  Real world reasoning 
and judgment takes place against a background of beliefs and assumptions about the 
nature of reality.   According to Wainryb (2006), “persons develop moral and other social 
concepts within their culture through participation in and reflection on social interactions 
of different kinds,” (p. 211; emphasis added).  In other words, people’s ideological 
worldviews impact their interpretation, and therefore judgment, of events in the world 
(Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Sibley & Duckitt, 2009; Stephan, Ybarra, & 
Morrison, 2009; Zarate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004).  Thus, differing informational 
assumptions about the nature of reality may explain why people reasoning about the same 
event can draw different conclusions (Turiel, Hildebrandt, & Wainryb, 1991; Turiel & 
Wainryb, 1998).  
  13 
Accordingly, empirical research reveals a strong correlation between beliefs and 
judgments (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997; Levy, Chiu, & Hong, 2006; Turiel et al., 
1991; Turiel & Wainryb, 1998; Wainryb, 1991).  For example, Wainryb (1991) found 
that people’s beliefs about the effectiveness of corporal punishment correlates with their 
judgments regarding its use in disciplining children.  In another study, Turiel, 
Hildebrandt, and Wainryb (1991) conducted a crosscultural analysis of the relationship 
between informational assumptions and judgments related to pornography, incest, and 
abortion.  They found that individuals who held similar beliefs on these issues tended to 
make the same judgment.  Regarding judgments on abortion, for instance, people who 
assumed life begins at conception tended to oppose abortion rights where as people who 
assumed life begins sometime later supported abortions rights. Informational 
assumptions, therefore, appear to function as the background (i.e. the context) within 
which judgments are made. According to Hatch (1983), “what appears to be a radical 
difference in values between societies may actually reflect different judgments of 
reality,” (p. 67).  Thus, in contrast to the moral foundations perspective, as informational 
assumptions change, so too should moral judgments. 
SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
The intuitionist and the rationalist approaches have competing explanations of the 
moral-divide between conservatives and liberals.  Importantly, the disagreement between 
these two perspectives is not about the automaticity of moral judgments—both 
perspectives agree that moral judgments are, or at least can be, automatic and 
unconscious (Haidt, 2001; Turiel, 2006).  Rather, the crux of the disagreement regards 
whether informational assumptions play a causal role in shaping moral judgments.   
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The rationalist approach argues that conservatives and liberals have different 
judgments about morality because of differing informational assumptions about the 
world.  Conservatives tend to endorse inequality and support the status quo because of 
informational assumptions that the existing social order is constantly in danger of 
collapsing due to challenges from dangerous and threatening outgroups (Duckitt, 2006; 
Jost et al., 2003).  They protect their ingroup by more strictly enforcing group norms and 
values, even at the short-term expense of individuals’ wellbeing.  Liberals, on the other 
hand, tend to oppose inequality and challenge the status quo (to the extent that it is 
unjust) because of informational assumptions that, generally speaking, the world is a 
stable and safe place and people are good (Duckitt, 2006; Jost et al., 2003).  As a result, 
liberals do not perceive outgroups as threatening and therefore tend to apply moral 
principles similarly between ingroups and outgroups. Thus, from the rationalist 
perspective, the differing informational assumptions of conservatives and liberals are the 
driving force behind their differing moral systems. 
According to the intuitionist approach, by contrast, it is the differential use of 
moral intuitions that produce the different judgments of conservatives and liberals.  
Liberals use only two intuitions—harm and fairness—and thus only social patterns 
related to individual-level concerns trigger automatic moral judgments.  Conversely, 
conservatives use all five intuitions and therefore social patterns related to both 
individual- and group-level concerns trigger moral judgment.  According to this 
perspective, conservatives tend to endorse inequality and support the status quo, not 
because they are fearful or defensive, but because they have more fully developed group-
level moral intuitions, relative to liberals.  From this perspective, longstanding traditions 
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and existing institutions of authority have inherent value and should not be tampered with 
lightly. Rather, situations in which individuals or groups challenge institutionalized 
authority or violate purity norms automatically trigger the corresponding intuition.  For 
intuitionists, this is the perfectly natural response of an individual with a fully developed 
moral matrix. 
There are two problems with the current literature that make empirical 
comparisons of the two models difficult.  First, because of the correlational nature of 
many of these studies, proponents of both models can look at the same research and 
interpret the findings to support their perspective.  Take, for example, the research on 
judgments about abortion, discussed above.  Intuitionists and rationalists agree that 
beliefs and judgments are correlated; however, they disagree about the causal relationship 
between beliefs and judgments.  Rationalists argue that informational assumptions caused 
the judgment whereas intuitionists argue that the judgment caused the beliefs. 
Second, despite changing scenarios, studies of moral foundations theory always 
keep the participant firmly embedded within the perspective of their ingroup.  Even when 
people are asked to evaluate the actions or worldviews of outgroup members, they are 
still doing so, whether implicitly or explicitly, in relationship to the impact of such 
actions and beliefs on their ingroup’s symbolic or material status.  For example, when 
conservatives condemn the behaviors of homosexuals, they are doing so at least in part 
because of the threat it represents to the values of their ingroup.  In short, the judgments 
are being made about how the actions of an outgroup impacts one’s ingroup or they are 
judgments about an ingroup member’s violation of ingroup norms. 
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Thus, one way to tease apart these two perspectives would be to hold the moral 
actions constant across conditions while varying whether the ingroup or a threatening 
outgroup performed the action.  In doing so, researchers would be able to empirically 
assess whether participants were drawing upon informational assumptions about the 
ingroup versus outgroup in their moral judgments.  If the informational assumptions 
associated with threatening outgroups are driving conservatives’ opposition to them (as 
the rationalist model would predict) then binding domains should only apply to the 
ingroup. However, if it is intuitions that are driving the judgments of conservatives, then 
these intuitions should be triggered regardless of the group-context in which the violation 
occurs. 
Keeping with his line of thought, I conducted two studies examining 
conservatives’ and liberals’ use of the five moral domains in an ingroup versus outgroup 
context.  In Study 1, participants completed the moral relevance questionnaire—used by 
Graham and colleagues (Graham et al., 2009)—while imagining they were observing 
actions in the US (ingroup), Iran (outgroup) or a control condition in which no group-
context was specified.  In Study 2, participants read a vignette in which a government 
violated the rights of minority group members in name of protecting the status quo.  The 
government in question was either the US (ingroup), Iran (outgroup) or the fictional 
country of Kasbara (control).  
Note that by holding the social patterns constant in both studies, but varying the 
group condition, I was able to examine the impact of informational assumptions (e.g. 
beliefs and values associated with group identity) on moral judgments. If informational 
assumptions contribute to shaping moral judgments, then the judgments of conservative 
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participants should vary across conditions.  If, however, intuitions determine moral 
judgments, then the judgments of all participants should remain constant across 
conditions. Stated another way, systematic differences in judgments across conditions 
will indicate the relevance of informational assumptions in judgment formation whereas 
consistency across conditions will point towards the primacy of intuitions. 
Before moving on, it is important to briefly discuss other measure included in the 
studies.  First, I included the Rosenberg self-esteem scale in both studies (Rosenberg, 
1965).  Jost and colleagues’ (Jost et al., 2003) meta-analysis of self-esteem and political 
conservatism indicated a significant (although relatively weak) negative correlation.  In 
addition, research demonstrates that individuals with low self-esteem are more likely to 
perceive outgroups as threatening and tend to become more defensive in response to 
outgroups threats (for a review, see Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000; Jost et al. 2003).  
Given the significant impact of threat perception on judgments of ingroups and 
outgroups, I included self-esteem as a potential moderating variable. 
Second, I also included several different measures of political ideology.  Moral 
foundations theory primarily relies on a single-item question to assess political ideology.  
Although research has shown that this is a reasonably good method for predicting 
attitudes and beliefs, there is increasing evidence that political orientation is multi-faceted 
and therefore a single liberal-conservative dimension glosses over the different 
sociopolitical worldviews that exist within this dichotomy (for a review, see Jost et al., 
2003).  Research by Duckitt and colleagues (2006) demonstrate that these features are 
captured nicely by the constructs of right wing authoritarianism and social dominance 
orientation.  It is important to note that these two constructs are orthogonal dimensions of 
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political ideology that generate unique predictions regarding attitudes towards, and 
perceived threat from, various outgroups—individuals high in right wing 
authoritarianism, but not those high in social dominance orientation, are threatened by 
deviant outgroups that undermine social stability, whereas high social dominance 
orientation individuals, but not individuals high in right wing authoritarianism, are 
threatened by groups that challenge the dominance and superiority of the ingroup 
(Duckitt, 2006).  Because the current studies involve a potentially threatening outgroup 
(Iran), I included right wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981) and social dominance 
orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) as alternative measures of 
political ideology. 
STUDY 1 
In Study 1, participants with varying political ideologies were assigned to one of 
three conditions: ingroup, outgroup, control.  Similar to the methodology used by Haidt 
and colleagues (Haidt & Graham, 2007), I asked participants to rate how relevant 
concerns related to the five domains are when making moral judgments.  However, I 
added an additional layer by asking participants to imagine they are making judgments 
about behaviors/events in the US (ingroup condition) or behaviors/events in Iran 
(outgroup condition).  By varying the group-context in which participants rate moral 
relevance items, I was able to examine whether higher-order informational assumptions 
associated with group-context significantly impact the relevance of the five moral 
domains. 
In order to replicate Graham and Haidt’s (2009) first study and create a baseline 
for the current study, I added a control condition in which there was no ingroup or 
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outgroup context manipulation—participants read the same instructions from Graham 
and Haidt’s original study.  However, I suspect that when contemplating abstract moral 
questions, people will, by default, make these considerations relative to their ingroup.  
Thus, I do not predict significant differences between the ingroup and control conditions. 
Regarding the ratings of liberals, the predictions of the intuitionist and rationalist 
perspectives do not differ from one another—liberals will report harm and fairness as 
significantly more relevant to their moral judgments across all three conditions.  
However, the two perspectives make divergent predictions regarding conservatives. If, as 
the intuitionists assert, particular social patterns trigger an intuition and corresponding 
judgment, then conservatives and liberals should show stable (although different) patterns 
in their self-reports of moral relevance across conditions—conservatives will report all 
five domains equally relevant whereas liberals will rely primarily on harm and fairness 
domains.  In contrast, if, as the rationalists argue, the binding domains apply only to 
ingroup members, then conservatives should rate the binding domains as significantly 
more relevant in the ingroup and control conditions, relative to the outgroup condition. 
METHOD 
Participants 
In order to qualify, participants had to be US citizens of at least 18 years of age. 
Participants were recruited through Amazon’s online data collection system, Mechanical 
Turk, and received 50 cents in exchange for participating in the study.  According to 
previous findings, stable patterns of differences between conservatives and liberals only 
emerge at the far ends of the scale.  Thus, a single-item question assessing political 
orientation (1 = strongly conservative, 5 = moderate, 9 = strongly liberal) was used as a 
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screening question.   Only participants who self-report as highly-conservative (rating of 1 
or 2) or highly-liberal (rating of 8 or 9) were able to participate in the study.  A total of 
285 participants (53% male, 47% female) provided complete data for the study. 
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 73 (mean age 37).  Overall, 145 participants self-
identified as conservative and 140 self-identified as liberal. 
Procedure 
 Participants completed the study online using Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Callison-Burch, 2009).  Research demonstrates that, relative to 
traditional methods of data collection using college undergraduates, data obtained using 
Mechanical Turk has similar levels of reliability while offering a more diverse sample 
population (Buhrmester et al., 2011).  
 The study design consisted of randomly assigning participants to either an 
ingroup, outgroup, or control condition and measuring their responses to the moral 
relevance questionnaire.  Initially, participants read the following introductory paragraph, 
and then clicked a button indicating that they wished to participate in the study: 
The current study, being conducted by Nolan Rampy, M.A. at the University of 
Vermont, aims to explore the relationship between morality and political views.  
You will be asked to read a brief paragraph describing the social and political 
culture of Iranian [or US] society and then complete a 16-item questionnaire 
about how you would make moral judgments while living within Iranian [or US] 
society.  After completing the moral judgments questionnaire, you will be asked 
to complete several more questionnaires regarding your personality traits and 
attitudes on various topics.  Your participation is completely voluntary, and your 
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responses will be anonymous.  We are interested in your honest opinions, so there 
are no right or wrong answers to these questions.  You will receive 50 cents to 
compensate you for your time.  It should take about 20 minutes to complete this 
task.  If you agree to participate, please click <continue>. 
After reading the introduction and agreeing to take part in the study, participants 
were asked to report demographic information, including their political affiliation.  
Participants were divided into two groups based on their response to the question 
regarding political orientation.  Participants who responded with a 1 or 2 were placed in 
the conservative group (n = 145) and participants who responded with an 8 or 9 were 
placed in the liberal group (n = 140). Participants in the experimental conditions then 
read a description of either US or Iranian society and filled out the moral relevance 
questionnaire while imagining that they were in that society. Participants in the control 
condition were simply asked to complete the questionnaire without any specification of 
group-context.  I used composite scores on the moral relevance questionnaire sub-scales 
to form the dependent variable.  More specifically, participants’ ratings of the harm and 
fairness domains were combined to form an individualistic morality composite score and 
ratings of the loyalty, authority, and purity domains were combined to form a group-level 
morality composite score.  After completing the moral relevance questionnaire, 
participants were given several questionnaires including self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965); 
social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994); and right wing authoritarianism 
(Altemeyer, 1981).  As discussed above, because self-esteem can be a relevant factor in 
ingroup bias, I used the self-esteem scale as a potential moderating variable (Aberson, 
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Healy, & Romero, 2000).  In addition, right wing authoritarianism and social dominance 
orientation were used as alternative methods for operationalizing political ideology. 
Materials 
Demographics.  During the registration process, participants answered questions 
regarding their gender, age, and education-level. 
Description of US society.  The description of US society was intended to convey 
that the US is a model of Western democratic societies seen around the world.   
Participants in the ingroup condition read, “The US is a typical western state…Many 
aspects of the society bear a striking resemblance to other western societies…They have 
a democratically elected government, a judicial branch, and a state-run police force to 
maintain order and protect the status quo.”  
Description of Iranian society.  In contrast to the description of US society, the 
description of Iranian society is intended to convey that, although the values of Iranian 
society significantly differ from those of the West, the social and political institutions in 
Iranian society are remarkably similar to Western countries.  For example, participants in 
outgroup condition read, “Iran identifies as an Islamic state…However, despite the 
religious nature of Iranian ideology, many aspects of the society bear a striking 
resemblance to secular western societies…They have a democratically elected 
government, a judicial branch, and a state-run police force to maintain order and protect 
the status quo,” (see Appendix A for the complete version of instructions for each 
condition).   
Moral Relevance Questionnaire.  I assessed the relevance of the five moral 
domains using the Moral Relevance Questionnaire developed by Graham and colleagues 
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(2009) (see Appendix A).  In the control condition, I used the instructions from Graham 
et al. (2009): “When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are 
the following considerations relevant to your thinking?”  However, I made a slight 
change in the instructions for the ingroup and outgroup conditions. In the current study, 
participants read, “Imagine that you are observing a variety of behaviors and events 
taking place in Iran (versus the US).  When deciding whether these things are right or 
wrong, to what extent would the following considerations be relevant to your thinking?”   
Participants then rated the moral relevance of 15 items on a 6-point scale (1 = 
never relevant, 7 = always relevant), with 3 items for each moral domain (e.g. Harm: 
“Whether or not someone used violence”; Fairness: “Whether or not some people were 
treated differently than others”; Loyalty: “Whether or not someone did something to 
betray his or her group”; Authority: “Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect to 
legitimate authority”; and Purity: “Whether or not someone violated standards of purity 
and decency”).  As in Graham and colleagues’ (2009) study, I inserted a 16th item stating 
“Whether or not someone believed in astrology,” as a check of whether participants are 
paying attention and accurately understanding the scale-response format.  Anyone using 
the upper half of the scale was not used in data analysis.  Only one participant was 
dropped for using the upper half of the scale. 
For the analysis, I combined ratings of the harm and fairness domains to create a 
composite score of individualistic morality.  Cronbach’s alphas showed strong reliability 
for the composite score across all three conditions (US, .84; Iran, .90; control, .81).  
Similarly, combined ratings of the loyalty, authority, and purity domains to create a 
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composite score of binding morality showed comparably high levels of reliability (US, 
.93; Iran, .90; control, .93). 
Right Wing Authoritarianism.  The right-wing authoritarianism scale (Altemeyer, 
1981) is a 12-item measure assessing authoritarian attitudes (see Appendix B).  
Authoritarianism is associated with social conservatism and traditionalism (high-
authoritarianism) on one end of the spectrum versus openness and individual freedoms 
(low-authoritarianism) on the other (Duckitt, 2006).  Typically, individuals high in 
authoritarianism view the stability of the social order as perpetually unstable and 
therefore constantly in danger of collapse and a descent into a competitive jungle. They 
view the world as “a dangerous and threatening place in which, deviant people’s values 
and way of life are threatened by bad people,” (p. 78; Duckitt et al., 2002).  In contrast, 
low-authoritarians (e.g. liberals) believe that people are basically good and the world is 
generally a safe and stable place.  Participants used a 5-point Likert scale (1 = certainly 
disagree; 5 = certainly agree).  The scale contains items such as “Obedience and respect 
for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.” 
Social Dominance Orientation.  The social dominance orientation scale (Pratto et 
al. 1994) is a 16-item measure assessing individuals’ endorsement of inequality and 
power distance (see Appendix C).  Individuals high in social dominance already view the 
world as a competitive jungle in which groups are in a perpetual zero-sum competition 
over access and control of resources.  At one end of the social dominance spectrum is a 
“might is right,” winner-take-all outlook and, at the other end “a view of the world as one 
of cooperative harmony in which people care for, help, and share with each other” (p. 78; 
Duckitt et al., 2002).  Participants used a 9-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
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neither agree nor disagree, 9 = strongly agree) to respond to scale-items [e.g. “Inferior 
groups should stay in their place”; “In getting what your group wants, it is sometimes 
necessary to use force against other groups”; “No one group should dominate society” 
(reverse scored)]. 
Self-Esteem.  The Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965) was used to 
measure individual differences in self-esteem (see Appendix D).  This is a 10-item self-
report measure in which individuals respond to items such as “I feel I am a person of 
worth, at least on an equal basis with others,” and “I wish I could have more respect for 
myself” (reverse scored).  Participants responded on Likert scale ranging from 1 = 
strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree. 
RESULTS 
Because the intuitionist perspective would essentially predict null findings, I will 
focus on the predictions of the rationalist perspective.  There are three predictions for 
Study 1.  First, the rationalist perspective predicts a significant interaction between 
political ideology and condition.  If the findings confirm the predicted interaction, there 
are two follow-up predictions regarding the pattern of these differences: (1) conservative 
participants in the ingroup condition will use the binding foundations significantly more 
than conservatives in the outgroup condition; and (2) conservatives in the ingroup 
condition will use the individualistic foundations significantly less than conservatives in 
the outgroup condition.   
The analysis consisted of a 3 (condition: US, Iran, control) X 2 (political 
orientation: conservative, liberal) MANOVA, with composite scores on the 
individualistic domains and on the group-level domains from the moral relevance 
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questionnaire as the two dependent measures.  This showed a main effect for political 
orientation for both the individualistic domain F(1, 203) = 20.32, p < .001 and the 
binding domain F(1, 203) = 13.10, p < .001.  However, the predicted interaction effect 
between political orientation and condition was not significant for the individualistic 
domain (p = .58) or the binding domain (p = .74). 
The results indicated that, regardless of condition, liberals reported relying more 
heavily on the individualistic domain (M = 4.83, SE = .09) relative to conservatives (M = 
4.23, SE = .10), p < .001.  In contrast, conservatives relied more heavily on the binding 
domain (M = 4.03, SE = .11) relative to liberals (M = 3.51, SE = .10), regardless of 
condition, p < .001.  The data indicate that group condition did not significantly impact 
participants’ ratings on the moral foundations questionnaire. 
Post-hoc analyses using race1, gender, and self-esteem as potential moderating 
variables did not yield significant results.  Similarly, using right wing authoritarianism or 
social dominance orientation as operationalizations of political ideology did not 
significantly affect the results. 
In summary, conservatives, relative to liberals, reported using the binding 
domains significantly more than liberals whereas liberals reported using the 
individualistic domains significantly more than conservatives.  Both the intuitionist and 
rationalist perspectives predicted this pattern of findings for the US and the control 
conditions.  Importantly, however, these differences remained consistent across the three 
conditions.  The absence of a significant interaction between political ideology and 
                                                
1 An additional analysis in which non-white participants were dropped from the data set 
did not alter the findings. 
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condition seems to support moral foundation’s perspective that informational 
assumptions associated with group-context are not relevant in moral judgments.   
One reason for the null findings across group context, however, could be the 
relatively abstract nature group-context manipulation.  It could be that the change in 
context across conditions was not particularly salient for participants.  Similarly, 
participants were rating the relevance of the moral domains without any reference to a 
specific situation or scenario.  Thus, the salience of the manipulation and the abstract 
nature of the moral relevance questionnaire may account for the null findings.  In order to 
explore these possibilities, in Study 2 I used a more in depth group-context manipulation 
and asked participants to make judgments about a specific situation related to a 
government violating the rights of minority groups. 
STUDY 2 
In Study 2, I examined participants’ moral judgments regarding violations of 
harm and fairness in one of three conditions: ingroup (US), outgroup (Iran), or control (a 
fictitious country named Kasbara).  More specifically, participants read one of three 
vignettes in which violations of harm and fairness are justified in the interest of 
protecting the status quo.  I designed the vignettes to highlight the ideological differences 
between the countries while keeping constant the social patterns—e.g. a nation’s 
government violating the rights of marginalized groups in order to protect the status 
quo—that would trigger intuitions.  Again, I predict no difference between the ingroup 
and control conditions. 
As in Study 1, the two perspectives make similar predictions regarding liberals—
they will judge the violations of harm and fairness as significantly more immoral (relative 
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to conservatives) across all three conditions.  Regarding conservatives, however, the 
intuitionist perspective argues that relevant social patterns trigger intuitional judgments, 
irrelevant of other contextual factors.  Therefore, because the actions of the government 
are held constant, intuitionists should predict that conservatives’ moral judgments will 
remain stable across conditions.  In contrast, if, as the rationalists argue, the binding 
domains are ingroup-specific, then conservatives should judge violations of harm and 




As in Study 1, participants were recruited through Mechanical Turk and 
participated in exchange for 50 cents. A total of 262 participants (54% men and 46% 
women) provided complete data for this study.  Participants ranged in age from 18 to 75 
(mean age 38). 
Political orientation was again used as a prescreening question.  Participants were 
divided into two groups based on their response to the question regarding political 
orientation.  Participants who responded with a 1 or 2 were placed in the conservative 
group (n = 130) and participants who responded with an 8 or 9 were placed in the liberal 
group (n = 132). 
 Procedure 
 Participants completed the study online using Mechanical Turk.  The study design 
consisted of randomly assigning participants to one of three conditions—ingroup, 
outgroup, or control—and measuring their moral judgment regarding actions performed 
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by the US government (ingroup condition), Iranian government (outgroup condition) or 
the fictitious government of Kasbara (control condition).  One hundred sixteen 
participants were in the US condition, 71 were in the Iran condition, and 75 were in the 
Kasbara condition. Initially, participants read an introductory paragraph describing the 
study as an examination of the relationship between attitudes and political views.  After 
reading the introduction and agreeing to take part in the study, participants were asked to 
report demographic information.  Participants then read a brief vignette in which the 
government (US vs Iran vs Kasbara) justified violating the rights of marginalized groups 
(i.e. violating principles of harm and fairness) by claiming that they are protecting the 
status quo.  After reading the vignette, participants completed a measure assessing their 
moral judgments regarding the actions of the government. Upon completing the measure, 
participants were given several personality questionnaires—self-esteem (Rosenberg, 
1965); social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994); and right wing authoritarianism 
(Altemeyer, 1981)—that I used as potential moderating variables. 
Materials 
Demographics.  During the registration process, participants answered questions 
regarding their gender, age, and education-level. 
Moral Violations Vignette.  Participants in each condition read a brief vignette 
(set 10 years in the future) about a period of economic, social, and political instability in 
which a government violates the rights of minority groups in order to protect the status 
quo.  For example, participants in the US condition read, “…in one particularly large 
protest in the nation’s capital, police killed roughly one hundred peaceful protestors and 
injured several thousand more.  In an effort to justify these actions, government officials 
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claim that the protests of Blacks and Latinos are threatening the security and stability of 
American society and that a firm and unequivocal response to the protestors is absolutely 
necessary in order to preserve the status quo.”   
In contrast, participants in Iran condition read “in one particularly large protest in 
the nation’s capital, police killed roughly one hundred peaceful protestors and injured 
several thousand more.  In an effort to justify these actions, the Iranian government 
officials claim that the protests of Kurds and Turks are threatening the security and 
stability of Iranian society and that a firm and unequivocal response to the protestors is 
absolutely necessary in order to preserve the status quo.” 
Finally, participants in the Kasbara condition read, “…in one particularly large 
protest in the nation’s capital, police killed roughly one hundred peaceful protestors and 
injured several thousand more.  In an effort to justify these actions, the Kasbara 
government officials claim that the protests of the Basanda and Kush are threatening the 
security and stability of society and that a firm and unequivocal response to the protestors 
is absolutely necessary in order to preserve the status quo.” (See Appendix E for the full-
length version of all three vignettes.) 
Vignette Evaluation.  The vignette questionnaire is a 9-item measure developed 
for this study assessing the degree to which participants agreed or disagreed with the 
actions taken by the government versus the actions taken by the minority groups (see 
Appendix F).  For example, participants in the US condition used a 7-point Likert scale 
(1 = completely disagree; 7 = completely agree) to rate statements such as, “The stability 
of US society is more important than meeting the demands of Black and Latino minority 
groups,” and “Blacks and Latinos are morally justified in demanding their individual 
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rights, even if it threatened the stability of American society.”  With the exception of the 
name of the government and minority groups, the 9-items were identical across all three 
conditions (e.g. Iran condition: “The stability of Iranian society is more important than 
meeting the demands of Kurds and Turks.”).  Cronbach’s alphas in all three conditions 
showed strong reliability (US, .95; Iran, .90; Kasbara, .89). 
As in Study 1, self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965), social dominance (Pratto et al., 
1994), and right wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981) were used in Study 2, with the 
same order and procedure. 
RESULTS 
As in Study 1, the intuitionist perspective would predict null findings across 
conditions.  In contrast, according to the rationalist perspective, conservatives should 
judge the government’s violations of harm and fairness significantly more favorably in 
the US condition, relative to the Iran condition. 
The analysis consisted of a 3 (condition: US, Iran, Kasbara) X 2 (political 
ideology: conservative, liberal) two-way ANOVA, using the vignette evaluation as the 
dependent measure.  This analysis revealed a main effect for political ideology F(1, 256) 
= 65.39, p = .01.  The results indicated that, regardless of condition, conservatives were 
more supportive of the government’s actions (M = 3.66, SE = .13) relative to liberals (M 
= 2.27 SE = .13), p < .001.  The interaction effect between political ideology and 
condition, however, was not significant (p = .67) indicating that changes in group context 
did not significantly impact the results directly nor through an interaction with political 
ideology.   
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Post-hoc analyses examining potential moderating variables did not produce a 
significant interaction effect2.  In addition, using right wing authoritarianism or social 
dominance orientation as operationalizations of political ideology did not significantly 
affect the results.  In short, as the intuitionist perspective would predict, the judgments of 
conservatives and liberals did not significantly differ across conditions. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 The current studies were undertaken to examine whether informational 
assumptions impact the moral judgments of conservatives and liberals.  Moral 
foundations theory posits that moral judgments are the product of innate moral modules 
that operate independently of higher cognitive faculties capable of taking informational 
assumptions into account.  In contrast, critics of moral foundations theory argue that 
informational assumptions are inextricably linked with moral decision-making.  If the 
intuitionist perspective of moral foundations theory is correct, then conservatives and 
liberals should show different but consistent patterns of moral judgments regardless of 
the context in which those judgments took place. However, if the rationalist view is 
correct then conservatives should arrive at different moral judgments depending on the 
group-condition whereas liberals should remain consistent regardless of the group-
condition.  Thus, the competing predictions of these two perspectives center on the 
judgments of conservatives. 
 In Study 1, across all three conditions conservatives relied more heavily on the 
binding domains of authority, loyalty, and purity whereas liberals relied on the 
                                                
2 As in Study 1, an analysis in which non-white participants were dropped from the data 
set did not alter the findings. 
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individualistic domains of harm and fairness.  Similarly, in Study 2, liberals and 
conservatives remained consistent in their judgments across all three conditions.  In both 
studies, this pattern of findings remained consistent across conditions regardless of 
whether political ideology was assessed using the single-item question, right wing 
authoritarianism, or social dominance orientation.  
The findings in both studies offer support for the intuitionist perspective in two 
ways.  First, the responses of both conservatives and liberals fit nicely with the existing 
body of literature.  As has been shown in numerous other studies, liberals tend to rely 
primarily on the domains of harm and fairness whereas conservatives tend to rely on all 
five domains equally.  Study 1 replicated this pattern of findings.  Similarly, in Study 2, 
which focused specifically on the application of harm and fairness domains, 
conservatives tended to endorse violations of harm and fairness in order to protect the 
status quo whereas liberals tended to oppose such violations.  The results of Study 2 in 
particular are significant because the methodology is significantly different than what is 
used in most moral foundations research.  The replication of past findings using unique 
methodology offers additional evidence for the validity of the five-domain taxonomy of 
morality. 
Second, and more importantly, the current findings offer support for the 
intuitionist argument that informational assumptions do not shape moral judgments.  In 
both studies, differing pattern of responses for conservatives and liberals remained 
constant across conditions.  This indicates that shifting informational assumptions 
associated with ingroup versus outgroup contexts did not play a causal role in shaping 
participants’ responses. 
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These findings are particularly significant because, although the argument that 
informational assumptions are irrelevant is probably one of the most contested aspects of 
the intuitionist perspective, there have been surprisingly few attempts to demonstrate this 
empirically.  In fact, other than the moral dumbfounding experiments discussed in the 
literature review, I was unable to find any research by proponents of the intuitionist 
perspective addressing this issue.  Instead, proponents of the intuitionist perspective have 
primarily focused on demonstrating the reliability of the five foundations as a moral 
taxonomy and expanding it to other political groups such as libertarians and the religious 
left (e.g. Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009).  Focusing on taxonomy, however, side-steps 
examination of the more contentious aspects of the theory.  Indeed, it should not be 
surprising that distinct political groups show consistent different but stable patterns in 
their use of the moral domains.  If an individual believes it is morally just to violate the 
rights of harm and fairness in order to protect the status quo, one would expect consistent 
judgments across different scenarios relevant to that belief.  In and of itself, this is not 
evidence for moral intuitions.  Indeed, the fact that people make moral judgments 
consistent with their worldview is certainly not a novel prediction among theories in 
moral psychology.  Thus, the current studies are an important contribution to the existing 
literature because they address a key aspect of the intuitionist perspective that thus far has 
received little attention.   
However, there are several alternative explanations for the current findings.  One 
potential reason for not detecting significant effects is that the studies lacked sufficient 
power.  Power analysis using G-Power, however, showed that the sample size was 
sufficient for detecting effects of medium effect size magnitude.  The studies did lack 
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adequate power to detect small effects but this fact is inconsequential as a small effect 
would likely not be meaningful, even if statistically significant.   
Second, the findings could be the result of weaknesses in the group-context 
manipulations.  In Study 1, the manipulation was relatively abstract. Participants read a 
brief and rather vague description of the US or Iran and then imagined that they were 
evaluating actions in one of these countries.  Without asking participants to respond to a 
specific scenario, the contextual factors may not have been particularly salient in the 
minds of participants, meaning that they were still thinking about the moral domains in 
highly abstract terms.  Study 2 attempted to use a more in depth context manipulation.  
The essays used in Study 2 highlighted the differing ideologies of each country.  In 
addition, the essay provided participants with a specific scenario in which potentially 
immoral actions were taken to protect the society.  Despite these efforts, the manipulation 
in Study 2 may have still lacked sufficient salience to activate the alternative 
informational assumptions that could have impacted judgments.  Unfortunately, this 
possibility cannot be assessed directly using the current data, as manipulation checks 
were not used in the studies. 
A third possibility is that the dependent variables, particularly for Study 1, may 
have been ill suited for the research questions.  Study 1 used the moral foundations 
questionnaire to assess the effects of the group context manipulation.  This measure is 
designed to gauge the general importance of each moral domain (i.e. the amount of 
weight a person gives to each domain when making any moral judgment).  Although it is 
certainly possible that a different manipulation might produce changes in ratings on this 
questionnaire, it is also possible that such shifts only come about when making actual 
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judgments of specific actions and situations.  Given that Study 2 attempted to address this 
issue by assessing participants’ judgments of specific actions taken by a government and 
minority groups in a period of social instability the weakness of the manipulation 
(discussed above) is the more likely alternative explanation for the results of Study 2. 
The results of the current studies certainly do not present insurmountable 
obstacles to the rationalist perspective; however, the findings should be encouraging to 
proponents of moral foundations theory. I hope that this research encourages others to 
explore the important but largely ignored issue of informational assumptions.  If moral 
foundations theory is to establish itself as the dominant perspective in moral psychology, 
researchers will need to move beyond abstract assessments of the moral domains.  
Instead, future research should move toward assessing moral judgments in more concrete 
ways.  Although the five moral domains are a useful taxonomy for categorizing morality, 
their existence as innate modules, capable of automatically producing moral judgments 
independent of informational assumptions associated with context, remains an open 
question.  
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APPENDIX A: Moral Relevance Questionnaire 
 
INSTRUCTIONS IN US CONDITION 
The US is a typical western state.  Many aspects of the society bear a striking 
resemblance to other western societies. They have a democratically elected government, 
a judicial branch, and a state-run police force to maintain order and protect the status 
quo.  Imagine that you are observing a variety of behaviors and events that are taking 
place in the US.  When deciding whether these things are right or wrong, to what extent 
would the following considerations be relevant to you thinking? 
 
INSTRUCTIONS IN IRAN CONDITION 
Iran identifies as an Islamic state.  However, despite the religious nature of Iranian 
ideology, many aspects of the society bear a striking resemblance to secular western 
societies.  They have a democratically elected government, a judicial branch, and a state-
run police force to maintain order and protect the status quo.  Imagine that you are 
observing a variety of behaviors and events taking place in Iran.  When deciding whether 
these things are right or wrong, to what extent would the following considerations be 
relevant to your thinking?  
 
INSTRUCTIONS IN CONTROL CONDITION 
When making moral judgments about whether something is right or wrong, to what 
extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Use the scale to indicate your answer 
 
1                  2                   3                  4                  5                  6 
        Never relevant                                                                              Always relevant 
 
Harm: 
Whether or not someone was harmed 
Whether or not someone suffered emotionally 
Whether or not someone used violence 
Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable 
 
Fairness: 
Whether or not some people were treated differently than others 
Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights 
Whether or not someone acted unfairly 
Whether or not someone ended up profiting more than others 
 
Ingroup: 
Whether or not someone does something to betray the group 
Whether or not someone shows a lack of loyalty 
Whether or not the action has a negative impact on the group 
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Whether or not someone put the interests of the group above his/her own 
 
Authority: 
Whether or not someone fulfills the duties of his or her role 
Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for decisions made by the group 
Whether or not someone respected the traditions of the group 
Whether or not leaders adhere to the values of the group 
 
Purity: 
Whether or not someone violated the standards of decency of the group 
Whether or not a group member did something disgusting 
Whether or not a group member did something unnatural or degrading 
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APPENDIX B: Right Wing Authoritarianism 
 
This survey is part of an investigation of general public opinion concerning a variety of 
social issues. You will probably find that you agree with some of the statements, and 
disagree with others, to varying extents. Please indicate your reaction to each statement 
on the line to the left of each item according to the following scale: 
 
Write down a -4 if you very strongly disagree with the statement. 
Write down a -3 if you strongly disagree with the statement.  
Write down a -2 if you moderately disagree with the statement. 
Write down a -1 if you slightly disagree with the statement. 
 
Write down a 0 if you feel neutral about the statement 
 
Write down a +1 if you slightly agree with the statement.  
Write down a +2 if you moderately agree with the statement. 
Write down a +3 if you strongly agree with the statement.  




1. The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the 
radicals and protestors are usually just “loud mouths” showing off their ignorance. 
 
2. Women should have to promise to obey their husbands when they get married. 
 
3. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to 
destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us. 
 
4. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else. 
 
5. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and 
religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create 
doubt in people’s minds 
 
6. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt 
every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly. 
 
7. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our 
traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers 
spreading bad ideas. 
 
8. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. 
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9. Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if 
this upsets many people. 
 
10. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating 
away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs. 
 
11. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, 
even if it makes them different from everyone else. 
 
12. The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to 
live.  
 
13. You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority’s view by 
protesting for women’s abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer. 
 
14. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and 
take us back to our true path. 
 
15. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our 
government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way things are supposed to be 
done.” 
 
16. God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed 
before it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished. 
 
17. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it 
for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action. 
 
18. A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are 
submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past. 
 
19. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the 
authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything. 
 
20. There is no “ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way. 
 
21. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy 
“traditional family values. 
 
22. This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just 
shut up and accept their group’s traditional place in society. 
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APPENDIX C: Social Dominance Orientation 
 
             1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
     completely                                neither agree                                completely 
       disagree                                   nor disagree                                     agree 
 
1) Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
 
2) In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups. 
 
3) It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others. 
 
4) To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. 
 
5) If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. 
 
6) It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the 
bottom. 
 
7) Inferior groups should stay in their place. 
 
8) Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. 
 
9) It would be good if groups could be equal. 
 
10) Group equality should be our ideal. 
 
11) All groups should be given an equal chance in life. 
 
12) We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. 
 
13) Increased social equality is beneficial to society. 
 
14) We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. 
 
15) We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible. 
 
16) No group should dominate in society. 
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APPENDIX D: Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
 
Indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither agree  Agree          Strongly 
Agree 
       Nor disagree 
              1--------------------2-------------------3----------------------4-------------------5 
 
_____1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
_____2. At times, I think I am no good at all. 
_____3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
_____4. I am able to do things as well as most other people. 
_____5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. 
_____6. I certainly feel useless at times. 
_____7. I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on equal plane with others. 
_____8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
_____9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. 
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APPENDIX E: Vignettes 
US VIGNETTE 
Imagine that it is 10 years in the future of the United States.  The past several 
years have been bad economically and socially for the US.  There has been a steady 
increase in unemployment over the past 5 years, which has now reached levels well over 
25%.  Black and Latino minority groups have been hit particularly hard by the crisis.  
Unemployment, homelessness, and poverty among these groups and is roughly double 
that of the general population.  Politicians are quick to blame these groups for the 
economic and social ills plaguing society, frequently referring to them as greedy and 
lazy.   
In response to what they perceive as attacks on their basic rights, Blacks and 
Latinos have begun going on strike and holding large scale demonstrations that have 
temporarily shut down businesses and governmental facilities throughout the US.  
Despite the fact that these acts of protest have been peaceful and modest in their 
demands, they have been met with increasingly violent repression from the state.  For 
example, in one particularly large protest in the nation’s capital, police killed roughly one 
hundred peaceful protestors and injured several thousand more.  In an effort to justify 
these actions, government officials claim that these protests are threatening the security 
and stability of American society and that a firm and unequivocal response to the 
protestors is absolutely necessary in order to maintain order and preserve the status quo.  
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IRAN VIGNETTE 
Imagine that it is 10 years in the future of Iran.  The past several years have been 
bad economically and socially in Iran.  There has been a steady increase in 
unemployment over the past 10 years, which has now reached levels well over 25%.  
Turkish and Kurdish minorities have been hit particularly hard by the crisis.  
Unemployment, homelessness, and poverty among these groups is roughly double that of 
the general population.  Iranian politicians are quick to blame these groups for the 
economic and social ills plaguing society, frequently referring to them as greedy and 
lazy.   
In response to what they perceive as attacks on their basic rights, the Turks and 
Kurds have begun going on strike and holding large scale demonstrations that have 
temporarily shut down businesses and governmental facilities throughout Iran.  Despite 
the fact that these acts of protest have been peaceful and modest in their demands, they 
have been met with increasingly violent repression from the state.  For example, in one 
particularly large protest in the nation’s capital, police killed roughly one hundred 
peaceful protestors and injured several thousand more.  In an effort to justify these 
actions, the Iranian government officials claim that these protests are threatening the 
security and stability of Iranian society and that a firm and unequivocal response to the 
protestors is absolutely necessary in order to maintain order and preserve the status quo.  
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CONTROL VIGNETTE 
Imagine that it is 10 years in the future of a fictional country named Kasbara.  The 
past several years have been bad economically and socially in Kasbara.  There has been a 
steady increase in unemployment over the past 10 years, which has now reached levels 
well over 25%.  Basanda and Kush minorities have been hit particularly hard by the 
crisis.  Unemployment, homelessness, and poverty among these groups is roughly double 
that of the general population.  Kasbara politicians are quick to blame these groups for 
the economic and social ills plaguing society, frequently referring to them as greedy and 
lazy.   
In response to what they perceive as attacks on their basic rights, Basanda and 
Kush groups have begun going on strike and holding large scale demonstrations that have 
temporarily shut down businesses and governmental facilities throughout Kasbara.  
Despite the fact that these acts of protest have been peaceful and modest in their 
demands, they have been met with increasingly violent repression from the state.  For 
example, in one particularly large protest in the nation’s capital, police killed roughly one 
hundred peaceful protestors and injured several thousand more.  In an effort to justify 
these actions, the Kasbara government officials claim that these protests are threatening 
the security and stability of society and that a firm and unequivocal response to the 
protestors is absolutely necessary in order to maintain order and preserve the status quo.  
 
  
  50 
APPENDIX F: Vignette Evaluation 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: In the next section you will read a brief paragraph about a 
hypothetical situation in the U.S.  Please read the paragraph carefully and answer the 
questions that follow. 
 
             1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
     completely                                neither agree                                completely 
       disagree                                   nor disagree                                     agree 
 
 
1) The stability of US society is more important than meeting the demands of Black and 
Latino minority groups. 
 
2) Blacks and Latino’s should not have put their individual interests ahead of the 
collective interests of the US. 
 
3) Ensuring the fair treatment and well-being of Blacks and Latinos is more important 
than protecting the status quo in the US. 
 
4) Overall, I agree with and support the actions of the US government. 
 
5) Overall, I agree with and support the actions of the Black and Latino minority groups. 
 
6) The US government was morally justified in prioritizing the stability of American 
society. 
 
7) Blacks and Latinos are morally justified in demanding their individual rights, even if it 
threatened the stability of American society. 
 
8) Overall, I think the actions of the US government were immoral. 
 
9) Overall, I think that the actions of the Black and Latino groups were immoral. 
 
